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Environmental performance rating and disclosure has 
emerged as an alternative or complementary approach 
to conventional pollution regulation, especially in 
developing countries. However, little systematic research 
has been conducted on the effectiveness of this emerging 
policy instrument. This paper investigates the impact of 
a Chinese performance rating and disclosure program, 
Green Watch, which has been operating for 10 years. 
To assess the impact of Green Watch, the authors use 
panel data on pollution emissions from rated and 
unrated firms, before and after implementation of the 
program. Controlling for the characteristics of firms and 
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locations, time trend, and initial level of environmental 
performance, the analysis finds that firms covered by 
Green Watch improve their environmental performance 
more than non-covered firms. Bad performers improve 
more than good performers, and moderately non-
compliant firms improve more than firms that are 
significantly out of compliance. The reasons for these 
different responses seem to be that the strengths of 
incentives that the disclosure program provides to the 
polluters at different levels of compliance are different 
and the abatement costs of achieving desired levels of 
ratings are different for different firms. 
 
 
Environmental Performance Rating and Disclosure: An Empirical Investigation of 




Department of Agricultural, Food and Resource Economics 
Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08850, USA 
 
Hua Wang 










Key words: environmental performance rating, public disclosure, developing country, China, 
Green Watch, program evaluation
                                                       
1 The authors are Assistant Professor of Rutgers University, Senior Economist of the World 
Bank, and Senior Fellow of the Center for Global Development, respectively. The authors 
gratefully acknowledge support for this research from Profs. Genfa Lu, Yuan Wang and Gangxi 
Xu of Nanjing University and would also like to thank seminar participants at the World Bank 
for their comments and suggestions. The views expressed in this paper are solely of those authors 
and do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors 





Environmental performance rating and disclosure (PRD) has emerged as a substitute or 
complement for traditional pollution regulation, especially in developing countries   [6]  [28]  [31]. 
Indonesia’s PROPER (Program for Pollution Control, Evaluation and Rating), initiated in June 
1995, was the first PRD program in developing countries.  Because of its perceived overall 
success, as measured by reduced emissions at a lower regulatory cost, many countries have 
established similar programs for a variety of industry sectors and pollutants in diverse economic, 
institutional and cultural settings.  These programs include the Philippines’ EcoWatch, India’s 
Green Rating Project, China’s Green Watch, Vietnam’s Green Bamboo, Ghana’s EPRD, and 
Ukraine’s PRIDE.  PRD programs are particularly attractive for developing countries because 
institutional weaknesses hinder conventional monitoring and enforcement of environmental laws, 
regulations, and standards   [8], and because PRD programs have lower regulatory costs   [6].  
The literature on the effectiveness of PRD programs is very limited and falls into two groups.  
The first compares the environmental performance ratings of firms before and after a program is 
implemented, and ascribes any ratings improvements to the program   [1].  However, this 
approach may be confounded by time-varying factors such as technology improvements.  The 
second group compares polluting emissions from rated and unrated firms, and credits 
performance improvements by rated firms to the program.  However, this approach may be 
confounded by selection bias (e.g., firms with better environmental performance may be more 
likely to be rated).   
It is rare to have pollution data for both rated and unrated firms before and after 
implementation of a PRD program.  Garcia et al.   [10]  [11] assess the effectiveness of Indonesia’s 
PROPER using measured pollution from rated and unrated firms, both ex ante and ex post. Their  
 
2007 study suggests that PROPER has reduced emissions intensity, with a particularly rapid and 
strong impact on firms that have poor initial compliance records.  Their 2009 study finds a strong 
reactive response during the first six months of disclosure, followed by a more moderate, but still 
significant, longer-run response as management adjusts to the new regime. 
This study extends PRD assessment to China, using panel data on pollution from rated and 
unrated firms, before and after implementation of the Green Watch program.  Our work offers 
two main contributions to the literature.  First, we exploit the panel structure of the data to 
control for confounding factors such as time-variant technology improvement and selection bias 
between rated and unrated firms.  Second, we go beyond a single measure of environmental 
performance to consider the impact of ratings disclosure on several measures, including 
emissions intensity and effluent concentrations for a variety of air and water pollutants.    
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the relevant literature, 
focusing on the role of PRD programs in developing countries.  Section 3 describes China’s 
Green Watch program, while Section 4 describes our survey instrument and provides descriptive 
statistics for major variables.  Section 5 presents our estimation model and results, and Section 6 
summarizes and concludes the paper.    
 
2.  Previous research 
The literature on pollution control policies includes extensive work on command-and-
control, market-based and information-based instruments   [6]].  Command-and-control 
instruments are often inefficient and ineffective in developing countries, because firms may fail 
to report adequately, regulators may lack the technical and administrative capacity for effective 
monitoring and enforcement, and judicial systems may be weak and/or corrupt.  These same  
 
weaknesses limit regulators’ ability to employ market-based instruments, which also work less 
effectively in countries where market failures are common and legal and institutional supports 
for formal market activities are weak.    
Information-based instruments can be effective in developing countries where strong 
regulatory institutions and/or well-developed markets are absent, but where enough information 
can be reliably obtained to provide credible performance ratings.  In practice, diverse 
information programs have served as complements to command-and-control and market-based 
instruments   [21].  Information programs reduce the information asymmetry between polluters 
and environmental stakeholders (consumers, communities, NGOs, investors), empowering these 
stakeholders to pressure polluters for improved environmental  performance   [5] [17] [26].    When 
implemented correctly, information instruments promote better interaction and dialogue among 
firms, stakeholders and regulators   [10].  
Information instruments also leverage markets in significant ways.  An extensive empirical 
literature suggests that disclosure of firms’ bad environmental performance reduces their stock 
prices both in developed countries   [8] [14][19] [23], [24]  and  developing  countries  such  as 
Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and the Philippines   [7].  Jackson   [16] and Boyle and Kiel   [4] review 
the impacts of disclosure on housing prices in the US, which are found to be lower near 
Superfund  sites   [22] [29],  hazardous waste sites   [30], non-hazardous landfills   [25], nuclear 
radiation sources   [9], and polluting manufacturing plants   [11].  Housing prices also respond to 
publicized environmental contamination incidents   [19]  [20].    
Information instruments have diverse forms, including reports of measured pollution, 
environmental accident reports, and environmental performance ratings.  In the US, for example, 
the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) discloses toxic chemical releases and waste management  
 
activities by significant toxic polluters and federal facilities.  In developing countries, however, 
weak regulatory institutions may have difficulty in implementing such emissions inventories.  In 
addition, despite an emerging literature on stakeholders’ role in improving firms’ environmental 
performance   [2] [3] [27] [33],  concerns  remain  about the public’s ability to understand and utilize 
complex emissions reports.  For example, Bui and Mayer   [5] find that the release of TRI’s 
highly-detailed information on facilities’ toxic emissions has virtually no effect on housing 
prices in neighboring areas, even when the release of such information is unexpected.  The dual 
problems of emissions inventories in developing countries – technical feasibility and public 
understanding – have led to a preference for programs that condense complex information into 
environmental performance ratings that are disclosed to the public.     
Research on the effectiveness of performance rating and disclosure (PRD) programs suggests 
that that have a significant, positive impact on regulatory  compliance   [1] [6] [10] [11] [32]. 
Dasgupta et al.   [6] summarize the changes in compliance rates for several PRD programs in 
Asia.  During the first and second years after inception, compliance rates among covered firms 
increased from 37% to 61% in Indonesia, 8% to 58% in the Philippines, 10% to 24% in Vietnam, 
75% to 85% in Zhenjiang, China and 23% to 62% in Hohhot, China.  
Several empirical studies also find that PRD programs have improved firms’ environmental 
performance in Indonesia   [1]  [10]  [11] and China   [32].  However, data constraints generally limit 
these studies to comparisons of environmental ratings before and after program implementation, 
or comparisons of compliance status between rated and unrated firms.  Unfortunately, 
intertemporal rating comparisons are subject to confounding effects from time-varying factors 
such as technology change, while cross-sectional comparisons can be subject to significant 
selection bias.    
 
3.  China’s Green Watch Program 
Despite long-standing efforts to control pollution with traditional regulatory instruments, 
China continues to have severe pollution problems.  This has led China’s State Environmental 
Protection Administration (SEPA) to test the effectiveness of environmental performance rating 
and disclosure in a program supported by the World Bank.  In 1999, SEPA launched its Green 
Watch program in Zhenjiang City, Jiangsu Province and Hohhot City, Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous District.  Zhenjiang implemented a relatively complex rating system, as shown in   
Figure 1, while Hohhot used a simpler rating system that was suited to its lower level of 
economic and institutional development (Wang et al., 2004).  As shown in Figure 1, Green 
Watch in Jiangsu rates firms’ environmental performance from best to worst in five colors – 
green for superior performance; blue for full compliance; yellow for meeting major compliance 
standards but violating some minor requirements; red for violating important standards; and 
black for more extreme non-compliance.  
Green Watch ratings provide incentives for firms to improve their environmental 
performance in a comprehensive way.  The primary benchmarks for ratings are China’s emission 
and discharge standards that specify effluent concentration limits.  Firms violating any of these 
standards are rated red, and firms violating standards in more than 60% of inspections are rated 
black.  The secondary benchmarks are China’s load-based emission and discharge standards.  
Firms that satisfy the primary benchmarks but violate the secondary standards are rated yellow.  
The ratings system also incorporates other performance indicators, including hazardous waste 
disposal practices, solid waste recycling, pollution accidents, public complaints, internal 
management requirements, China cleaner production certificates, ISO 14000 certificates,  
 
administrative penalties, and other citations for illegal activity.  For each indicator, the system 
specifies a link to ratings that is clear, unambiguous and publicly available.       
The first Green Watch ratings were disclosed through the media in 1999.  The program was 
extended from Zhenjiang to all of Jiangsu Province in 2001, and to eight other provinces during 
2003-2005.  Nationwide implementation of Green Watch has been promoted since 2005.    
Overall, the available evidence suggests a positive impact for the program.  Table 1 shows that in 
Zhenjiang, the percentage of firms with positive ratings (green, blue and yellow) increased from 
75% in 1999 to 85% in 2000.  The most significant changes were in the extremely-noncompliant 
black group, whose percentage dropped from 11% in 1999 to 2% in 2000, and a major shift from 
the partially-compliant yellow group (44% to 22%) to the fully-compliant blue group (27% to 
61%).  
Evidence for the Green Watch program in Jiangsu Province indicates both increasing 
participation by firms and improvement in their compliance rates.  As shown in Table 1, the 
number of rated firms increased more than tenfold, from 1,059 in 2001 to 11,215 in 2006; and 
the percentage of firms with positive ratings (green, blue, and yellow) increased from 83% in 
2001 to 90% in 2006.  Furthermore, Table 1 suggests that Green Watch ratings provide a strong 
improvement incentive for noncompliant (red and black) firms, with stronger effects on firms 
with red ratings (moderate noncompliance) than those with black ratings (extreme 
noncompliance). 
4.  Data 
This study utilizes a pollution dataset for both rated and unrated firms during the period 
1996-2001 in four cities of Jiangsu province (Huaian, Wuxi, Yangzhou, and Zhenjiang). 
Following the success of the pilot program in Zhenjiang, Huaian, Wuxi and Yangzhou adopted  
 
the same program in 2001. Table 2 provides information on socioeconomic and environmental 
conditions in the four cities, as well as polluting emissions in 2001.  Wuxi has the largest 
population as well as the highest GDP per capita, while Huaian is the poorest.  Wuxi and 
Yangzhou have the lowest readings for air quality, measured by SO2 (sulfur dioxide) and NO2 
(nitrogen dioxide), and water quality measured by TSS (total suspended solids) and regulatory 
compliance percentage.    
The dataset includes detailed information on the firms’ characteristics, pollution, and 
environmental performance ratings.  We obtained this information from the municipal 
environmental protection bureaus of the four cities.  Their pollution monitoring, inspection and 
environmental information systems are well-developed and well-managed, primarily because of 
their long-standing experience with pollution registration requirements and China’s pollution 
charge system.
2  Table 3 shows that 36.7% of the firms in the sample were rated by Green 
Watch.  The majority of rated firms were assigned blue (60.38%) and yellow (22.37%); only a 
few earned the best (green) rating (2.96 %) or the worst (black - 2.96%).  The distributions are 
similar across cities, with the majority of firms rated blue and yellow, and very few green and 
black. 
5.  Multivariate analysis 
Our pollution data are sufficiently detailed to permit assessment of Green Watch for both 
water and air pollution, measured by intensity and effluent concentration.  Pollution intensity is 
total emissions divided by the gross value of output.  We use total suspended solids (TSS), 
chemical oxygen demand (COD) and generated waste water to measure water pollution, and 
sulfur dioxide (SO2), waste gas, and dust and smoke to measure air pollution.  
                                                       
2 For discussion of firm-level pollution data in China, see Wang and Wheeler (2006).  
 
The dependent variables in our multivariate analyses are changes in pollution intensity and 
concentration for different pollutants.  Let pollution intensity be specified as Yi,t for firm i in year 
t.  The dependent variable for the intensity equation is the first difference, Yi,t - Yi,t-1. The 
reduced-form fixed effects model for Yi,t - Yi,t-1 is  
 





Endogeneity is not a serious problem in this case, because ratings released in year t are based on 
multi-dimensional performance observations during year t – 1.   
If sample firms were randomly assigned to rated and unrated groups, we would not expect a 
statistical difference in intergroup pollution at t -1, before the first Green Watch disclosure in 
period t.  Assessing prior randomness is complicated in this case by the distributions of pollution 
intensity and effluent concentration.  Both are highly skewed, with skewness coefficients ranging 
from 3 to 9.  In this case, the traditional student t test for equality of pre-rating group means is 
not appropriate.  We employ the nonparametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for equal means 
and the K-sample test for equal medians.  Our results, reported in Table 4, show that significant 
differences in means and medians are common in the sample.  In Zhenjiang, where Green Watch 
began in 1999, we find significant differences in mean and/or median pollution intensities for 
waste water, COD  and dust and smoke, and significant differences in mean and/or median 
effluent concentrations  for TSS, COD  and dust and smoke.  Table 4 reports similar findings for  
 
the other three sample cities (Huaian, Wuxi and Yangzhou), where the first public disclosure of 
ratings occurred in early 2001.
3   
In light of these results, it is appropriate to introduce controls for pre-program pollution in our 
estimating equation: 
 
(2) Yit-Yit-1 =  β0 + α1 Fit + α2 Cit + α3 Rit + β1 t + β2 Yit-1  + µit + εit 
 
To determine the appropriate estimator, we employ Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier 
(BPLM) tests for random effects.  We reject the null hypothesis in favor of the random effects 
model for air pollution intensities, and for air and water effluent concentrations.  We assume that 
εit is correlated across firms within a city but uncorrelated across firms in different cities. 
Table 5/6 and 7/8 present estimation results for changes in pollution intensity and effluent 
concentration, respectively.  In Tables 5 and 7, we test whether a firm reduces pollution simply 
because it is rated.  A priori, it is possible that self-scrutiny by a rated firm results in better 
environmental management and reduced pollution, even if the firm’s rating is good. Our results 
for the regression variable PRD are consistent with this hypothesis:  PRD rating has a negative 
impact on pollution for all equations in Tables 5 and 7, and a statistically significant impact on 
TSS and SO2 for pollution intensity, and dust and smoke for effluent concentration.   
Tables 6 and 8 provide more insight, by identifying specific color ratings for firms.  Here we 
find very strong results for water pollution intensity (TSS and COD) and dust-and-smoke 
intensity in Table 6, with highly-significant reductions for poorly-rated firms that are much 
larger than reductions for firms with better ratings.  Intensities generally decline more among 
                                                       
3 We also conducted the equal mean and median tests for each of the three cities. The results are qualitatively 
similar.   
 
rated firms for the other pollutants as well, but without the striking differential for poorly-rated 
firms.  The same general pattern holds in Table 8, with generally-declining effluent 
concentrations across all rated firms and the largest impacts among poorly-rated firms.  Although 
some concentration results are highly significant, the overall significance level is somewhat 
lower than for pollution intensities.  Across both tables, red-rated firms exhibit stronger 
responses than black-rated firms.   
 
6.  Summary and conclusions 
This study has employed a new panel data set to test the impact of environmental performance 
rating and disclosure (PRD) on polluting firms in China.  The data include ex ante and ex post 
pollution measures for both rated and unrated firms, enabling us to control for confounding 
factors such as time-variant technology improvement and selection bias.  Our results strongly 
suggest that Green Watch has significantly reduced pollution from rated firms, with particularly 
strong impacts on firms with poor ratings.  Among poorly-rated red and black firms, the impact 
is generally greater on red-rated firms that are closer to compliance with regulations.   The 
reasons for these responses can be that the incentive for improvement that the Green Watch 
generates is stronger for firms with poor ratings than those with good ratings, and that the 
abatement costs for the red-rated firms to achieve compliance are lower than those black rated 
firms, even though the pressure for improvement can be stronger with the black-rated firms than 
the red-rated firms.  
This research also adds some insights to the growing comparative literature on PRD’s.  After 
studying PRD experiences in Indonesia (PROPER) and the Philippines (EcoWatch), Dasgupta et 
al.   [6] argue that PRD programs are most effective in moving moderately non-compliant firms  
 
into compliance with regulations, but may provide insufficient incentives to induce significant 
improvements by the worst performers or firms with good ratings.  However, our results for 
Green Watch indicate significant impacts for firms with good (green and blue) ratings.  The 
stronger result for our four cities in Jiangsu Province may stem from two additional benefits for 
green-rated firms:  (a) Enterprises awarded green in a particular year can be given priority 
consideration in the selection of enterprises with the best economic and social performance 
records; and (b) an enterprise that has won green for three consecutive years is given preferential 
status by provincial environmental regulators.  The Jiangsu experience suggests that stronger 
results can be produced by PRD programs that target highly-rated firms for benefits beyond 
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Table 1. Firms’ Environmental Performance Ratings by the Green Watch Program in Jiangsu 
Province, China (% Representation in Parentheses) 





































































































Sources: Pilot program in Zhenjiang: Wang et al. (2004). Province-wide program: the Legislative 
Affairs Office of the China State Council (2007) (available at 
http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/dfxx/dffzxx/js/200706/20070600021431.shtml; last assessed 




Table 2.  City Comparisons for Industiral Pollution and Socioeconomic and Environmental 
Conditions, 2001 
        
   Huaian Wuxi Yangzhou  Zhenjiang 
Socioeconomic conditions        
  GDP per capita (Yuan)  14,359 37,700 21,311  18,852
  Economic growth rate (%)  11.05 12.20 7.30 11.10
  Unemployment rate (%)  3.84 3.62 3.60 2.30
  Population (1,000)  558 2,131 1,097 628
Environmental conditions   
  TSS: Total suspend solids (mg /m3)  0.158 0.144 0.237  0.105
  SO2: sulfur dioxide  (mg /m3)  0.037 0.056 0.023  0.024
  NO2: nitrogen dioxide (mg /m3)  0.027 0.034 0.035  0.038
  % of drinking water meeting standards  93.00 97.96 98.80  96.43
  % of surface water meeting standards  83.00 91.67 62.00  88.89
  Noise (dB(A))  55.80 56.90 53.20  55.50
Total industrial pollution emissions   
  Waste water (10,000 tons)  1,674 14,010 3,774  4,544
  COD: chemical oxygen demand (tons)  1,708 N.A. 6,787  25,200
  Waste gas (100 million m
3) 129 471 461  1,895
  Smoke (tons)  11,063 8,611 5,385  47,421
  SO2 (tons)  8,863 21,492 35,765  96,377
  Solid waste (10,000 tons)  1 8  N.A.  265




Table 3. Distributions of Sample Firms During 1997-2001 
Total number of rated (R) and nonrated (NR) firms by city and year 
Year Status  Huaian  Wuxi  Yangzhou  Zhenjiang  Total 
1997 
a Unrated  42 33 64  89  228 
1998 
a Unrated    46 26 71  81  224 
1999 
a Unrated    46 32 76  12  166 
 Rated          57  57 
2000 Unrated    54  43  68 13  178 
 Rated          78  78 
2001   Unrated   16  1  13  131  161 
 Rated    39  69  59  91  258 
1997-2001 Unrated    204  135  292  326  957 
 Rated  39  69  59  226  393 
 Total  243  204  351  552  1350 
Distribution of  rated firms by rating colors* 




























































































          * Figures in parentheses represent the percent of firms by rating colors.  
a  Green Watch began in Zhenjiang in 1999, and in the other three cities in 2001. Thus, no firms 
were rated in 1997 and 1998, and only some firms in Zhenjiang were rated in 1999 and 2000.   
 
 
Table 4. Pollution Intensities and Effluent Concentrations for Unrated Firms and Firms Rated for the First Time   
  Pollution Intensity  Effluent Concentration 
  Water TSS COD  SO2  Dust/Smoke  Gas  TSS COD  SO2 Dust/Smoke 









































Equal  mean  test 3.64* 0.13  0.82  0.42  3.21* 0.52  3.77** 1.30  0.73  0.67 
Equal median test  5.14**  0.15  2.73*  0.17  0.48  0.10  6.71*** 3.25*  1.99  2.58* 









































Equal mean test  2.93**  0.06  6.83***  1.67  1.25  2.42  5.06** 8.71***  0.01  0.22 
Equal median test  7.54***  1.23  2.58*  0.05  0.83  1.52  7.02*** 10.57***  0.14  0.23 
  
 





Water Pollution  Air Pollution 
 TSS  COD  SO2  Waste  Gas 
Dust & 
Smoke 
PRD   -41.62  -15.47**  -18.23  -0.05  -11.06  -0.02 
  (29.35)  (7.82) (21.85)  (0.06) (12.96)  (0.03) 
Lagged  pollution    -0.56*  -0.94*** -1.01***  -1.00*** -0.75***  -0.80*** 
  intensity  (0.31)  (0.15) (0.17) 0.00   (0.27)  (0.16) 
City dummies (base = Wuxi)           
  Huanan  -277.03***  -11.29***  -25.94  -0.02  -6.27*  0.03*** 
 (26.99)  (3.79)  (23.11)  (0.01)  (3.24)  (0.01) 
  Yangzhou  -259.84***  -6.37  -24.28  -0.09***  -14.56*  -0.02*** 
 (24.50)  (8.66)  (42.11)  (0.02)  (7.48)  (0.01) 
  Zhengjiang  -287.32***  0.07  -6.66  -0.07***  -11.41*  0.00 
 (36.43)  (5.31)  (37.96)  (0.01)  (6.51)  (0.01) 
Firm size (base = small)           
  Large  16.31**  -14.18  -29.13  -0.07***  -6.53***  -0.02 
 (7.20)  (10.29)  (37.82)  (0.02)  (1.50)  (0.02) 
  Medium  30.02  -14.73**  -22.42  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01 
 (30.30)  (6.01)  (25.97)  (0.03)  (6.48)  (0.02) 
Ownership structure (base = private)         
 State-owned  -114.86**  14.66*  23.14   (0.03)  (9.15)  (0.02) 
 (52.68)  (8.27)  (19.18)  (0.09)  (6.44)  (0.05) 
 Collectively-   -113.49*  12.91***  1.66  -0.06  -16.09**  -0.02 
    owned  (61.29)  (3.53)  (19.67)  (0.08)  (6.73)  (0.05) 
 HK, Macao, &   -169.5  46.81***  -10.71  -0.04  -13.75*  -0.04 
 Taiwan investor  (158.32)  (17.24) (19.96) (0.08)  (7.60)  (0.04) 
 Foreign investor  -17.23  9.4  -2.85  -0.06  -21.77***  0.01 
 (46.86)  (12.93)  (5.59)  (0.07)  (8.24)  (0.05) 
 Companies with   -113.59*  23.82*  51.00   (0.06)  -17.30***  (0.03) 
    limited shares  (62.37)  (13.86) (45.32) (0.07)  (6.11)  (0.04) 
 Others  -110.31***  7.27   2.67   (0.08)  -19.37**  (0.04) 
  (33.46)  (7.43) (7.98)  (0.07) (9.22)  (0.04) 
Firm age (years)  0.36*  -0.21**  -0.12**  0.00   (0.08)  0.00  
  (0.21)  (0.10)  (0.05)  0.00   (0.13)  0.00  
Industry (base = mining)           
  Food & 
beverages 41.43  18.64  17.37  -0.26***  4.98  -0.32*** 
 (84.23)  (16.99)  (10.80)  (0.03)  (7.14)  (0.07) 
  Textiles and 
leather -57.54  11.97  25.70*  -0.19**  3.85  -0.30***  
 
 (48.65)  (9.28)  (14.86)  (0.08)  (3.96)  (0.06) 
  Pulp & paper  -39.94  47.03**  95.62  -0.26***  3.27  -0.33*** 
 (69.45)  (19.59)  (72.80)  (0.04)  (3.70)  (0.07) 
  Chemicals  -18.07  27.17  86.95**  -0.15**  8.61*  -0.26*** 
 (55.47)  (18.02)  (43.88)  (0.07)  (4.93)  (0.07) 
  Medical  -28.76  7.18  46.21**  -0.28***  2.59  -0.33*** 
 (50.67)  (8.67)  (18.42)  (0.02)  (3.73)  (0.06) 
  Fiber, rubber &   -33.66  19.83  9.34  -0.26***  20  -0.33*** 
      plastic  (65.93)  (26.68)  (15.45)  (0.04)  (12.85)  (0.07) 
  Smelting  (52.41)  4.56   11.52   -0.29***  0.81   -0.33*** 
 (66.49)  (12.51)  (14.89)  (0.03)  (5.51)  (0.07) 
  Machinery    (100.65)  11.87   12.53**  -0.28***  0.50   -0.33*** 
      manufacture  (89.26)  (11.87) (6.02) (0.02)  (1.63)  (0.06) 
  Utilities  145.69*  5.53   13.66   -0.12***  33.50   -0.27*** 
 (74.49)  (16.52)  (39.68)  (0.03)  (35.80)  (0.08) 
  Transportation   (58.63)  20.67*  (2.78)  -0.30***  (1.72)  -0.32*** 
 (67.32)  (11.46)  (8.49)  (0.06)  (3.95)  (0.08) 
  Others   -24.54  9.74  12.69  -0.24***  1.12  -0.31*** 
 (25.03)  (16.18)  (8.75)  (0.04)  (3.19)  (0.06) 
Time trend   13.04   1.67   2.46   0.00   3.28   0.00  
  (8.84)  (2.50) (6.27)  (0.02) (4.18)  (0.01) 
Constant 377.03***  (0.18)  2.11    0.43***  18.97***  0.36*** 
 -107.85  -20.45  -34.02  -0.08  -6.75  -0.07 
No. of obs   1320   1128   1296   1158   1229   1104  
within R
2  0.15  0.61 0.73  0.99 0.49  0.82 
between R
2  0.16  0.52 0.84    0.97 0.33  0.61 
overall R
2  0.14  0.39 0.77  0.99 0.33  0.62 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test for random effects 
Test statistics: χ
2(1)   0.04  0.19  0.05  75.13*** 5.27**  21.68*** 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the estimated coefficients. ***, **, and * represent 





Table 6. Estimation Results for Pollution Intensity Increases: Five-Color Ratings 
  Waste 
Water 
Water Air 
 TSS  COD  SO2  Waste  Gas  Dust/Smoke 
Rating dummies (base = not rated)       
Green   -46.24  -4.37  -0.51  -0.05**  -6.06**  0.01 
  (53.17)  (6.63)  (4.01) (0.02) (2.45)  (0.01) 
Blue   -12.35  -9.18***  -5.1  -0.03**  -4.26  0.00 
  (8.56)  (2.39)  (4.58) (0.02) (6.20)  (0.01) 
Yellow   -16.32  -13.69*  -30.51  -0.04*  -5.84  -0.03** 
 (18.19)  (7.32)  (23.78)  (0.02)  (3.88)  (0.01) 
Red   24.03  -35.14***  -44.40***  -0.05**  -5.48*  -0.03* 
 (30.88)  (5.76)  (10.95)  (0.02)  (2.87)  (0.01) 
Black   -11.4  -19.72***  -25.06***  -0.15  -5.3  -0.16* 
  (32.89)  (2.67)  (8.34) (0.12) (5.81)  (0.09) 
Lagged pollution   -0.56*  -0.94***  -1.00***  -1.00*** -0.75***  -0.80*** 
intensity (0.31)  (0.15)  (0.16) 0.00 (0.27)  (0.16) 
City dummies (base = Wuxi)         
Huanan -270.10***  -11.20***  -27.55  -0.02*  -5.79**  0.02** 
 (23.91)  (3.13)  (22.27)  (0.01)  (2.32)  (0.01) 
Yangzhou -251.97***  -6.64  -26.67  -0.10*** -14.27**  -0.03*** 
 (23.46)  (7.87)  (40.37)  (0.02)  (6.37)  (0.01) 
Zhengjiang -275.58***  -0.24  -6.82  -0.07*** -12.54*  0.00 
 (30.74)  (4.41)  (33.79)  (0.01)  (7.21)  (0.00) 
Firm size (base = small)         
Large 13.66**  -15.44  -30.23  -0.07*** -8.09***  -0.02* 
 (6.36)  (11.08)  (39.11)  (0.02)  (2.57)  (0.01) 
Medium 24.35  -16.17**  -23.81  -0.03  -2.02  -0.01 
 (30.51)  (7.55)  (29.53)  (0.02)  (4.53)  (0.01) 
Ownership structure (base = private)       
State-owned -113.99**  15.31*  23.5  -0.03  -8.77  -0.02 
 (47.38)  (9.17)  (20.86)  (0.09)  (7.29)  (0.05) 
Collectively owned  -106.28**  14.33***  2.7  -0.06  -15.24**  -0.02 
 (47.70)  (3.97)  (17.08)  (0.09)  (6.85)  (0.05) 
HK, Macao &   -146.61  48.76***  -8.14  -0.04  -10.38*  -0.04 
Taiwan investor  (178.46)  (17.67) (27.85) (0.07) (5.78)  (0.04) 
Foreign investor  19.3  11.12  -0.84  -0.06  -19.02***  0.01 
  (56.03) (11.37) (7.19) (0.07) (6.22)  (0.05) 
Companies with   -99.66**  25.36*  52.34  -0.05  -16.26**  -0.03 
limited shares  (48.54)  (14.97)  (50.35) (0.07)  (6.31)  (0.04) 
Others -92.33***  11.51*  10.45  -0.07  -17.10**  -0.03  
 
 (29.16)  (6.84)  (16.47)  (0.06)  (7.77)  (0.04) 
Firm age (years)  0.32***  -0.21**  -0.07  0  -0.1  0 
 (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.06)  0.00  (0.14)  0.00 
Industry (base = mining)         
Food & beverages  50.26  19.02  16.87*  -0.26*** 3.8  -0.31*** 
  (89.18) (16.31) (9.34) (0.03) (5.06)  (0.08) 
Textiles and 
leather -64  13.86*  27.70*  -0.19**  3.33  -0.29*** 
 (49.92)  (7.39)  (14.67)  (0.09)  (2.74)  (0.07) 
Pulp & paper  -45.68  47.79**  94.92  -0.27*** 2.27  -0.33*** 
 (77.88)  (20.04)  (69.00)  (0.04)  (2.70)  (0.07) 
Chemicals -25.34  27.33  85.24*  -0.15**  7.33*  -0.26*** 
 (62.05)  (18.48)  (46.95)  (0.07)  (4.23)  (0.07) 
Medical -32.38  8.39  47.90***  -0.28*** -0.05  -0.33*** 
 (49.98)  (8.36)  (17.31)  (0.02)  (2.53)  (0.07) 
Fiber, rubber &   -38.3  19.67  5.93  -0.26*** 18.71  -0.32*** 
     plastic  (65.87)  (26.08)  (20.49)  (0.04)  13.91)  (0.07) 
Smelting -49.93  4.12  10.07  -0.29*** 0.03  -0.33*** 
 (62.06)  (11.75)  (14.23)  (0.03)  (4.38)  (0.07) 
Machinery    -102.24  11.2  9.34***  -0.29*** -0.87  -0.32*** 
manufacture (87.87)  (12.63)  (3.44) (0.02) (1.05)  (0.06) 
Utilities 154.48*  4.44  10.57  -0.12*** 31.06  -0.27*** 
 (90.40)  (16.83)  (36.76)  (0.04)  32.86)  (0.08) 
Transportation -42.63  23.17***  -0.19  -0.29*** 3.27  -0.32*** 
 (60.82)  (6.49)  (10.26)  (0.04)  (2.84)  (0.07) 
Others -22.62  10.17  13.15*  -0.24*** 0.85  -0.30*** 
  (32.06) (15.22) (7.11) (0.03) (2.27)  (0.06) 
Time  trend  12.82  1.67  2.52 0.00 3.28  0.00 
  (8.56)  (2.52)  (6.32) (0.02) (4.22)  (0.01) 
Constant 404.84***  4.3  10.24  0.45***  30.09***  0.37*** 
 (114.78)  (25.46)  (48.67)  (0.09)  (9.50)  (0.09) 
No. of obs   1320 (4)  1128 (4)  1296(4)  1158 (4)  1229 (4)  1104 (4) 
within R
2  0.15  0.61  0.73 0.99 0.49  0.82 
Between R
2  0.16  0.52  0.84 0.97 0.33  0.61 
overall R
2  0.14  0.39  0.77 0.99 0.33  0.62 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test for random effects 
Test statistics: χ
2(1)   0.06  0.14  0.05  71.64*** 5.17**  23.77*** 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the estimated coefficients. ***, **, and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
  
 
Table 7. Estimation Results for Pollution Concentration Increase: Rated vs. Unrated firms  
 Water  Air 
 TSS  COD  SO2  Dust/Smoke
PRD   -21.76  -31.45  -32.72**  -29.94**  
 (17.67)  (28.59)  (14.69)  (14.63) 
Lagged pollution intensity  -0.50*  -0.57***  -1.02***  -1.00*** 
  (0.28)  (0.03)  (0.00)   (0.00)  
City dummies (base = Wuxi)     
  Huanan  -44.52  -32.72***  -136.48*  -133.30*   
 (37.69)  (8.98)  (78.80)  (72.49) 
  Yangzhou  10.99  -85.95**  -3  -29.81 
 (29.41)  (36.22)  (21.63)  (29.67) 
  Zhengjiang  9.11  -50.03*  -40.24  -44.08 
 (37.23)  (25.89)  (32.61)  (28.44) 
Firm size (base = small)       
  Large  46.17  -11.1  91.68  89.42 
 (30.65)  (25.74)  (115.56)  (105.23) 
  Medium  31.62**  38.21  68.88**  74.29*** 
 (16.11)  (36.70)  (33.95)  (23.99) 
Ownership structure (base = private)   
  State-owned  -7.97  -48.77**  2.79  -10.12 
 (31.43)  (22.30)  (81.34)  (99.86) 
  Collectively-owned  -24.28  -81.77  -75.84***  -78.17 
 (31.73)  (50.92)  (29.33)  (51.18) 
  HK, Macao & Taiwan investor  -71.65**  -123.66***  -150.52  -146.23 
 (35.61)  (40.66)  (95.66)  (90.76) 
  Foreign investor  -23.82  -78.31**  -70.96  -74.38 
 (41.25)  (35.54)  (48.88)  (52.14) 
  Companies with limited shares  -30.64  -68.33  -104.19***  -87.09**  
 (23.55)  (48.15)  (40.15)  (43.20) 
   Others  -46.89**  -103.96**  -33.63  -31.56 
 (18.73)  (47.75)  (55.95)  (69.48) 
Firm age (years)  0.17  0.7  0.43  0.38 
 (0.42)  (0.87)  (0.64)  (0.68) 
Industry (base = mining)       
  Food & beverages  31.87  -100.11*  70.79  3.7 
 (27.39)  (51.64)  (47.65)  (26.30) 
  Textiles and leather  14.72*  -71.75  18.11  -25.07 
 (8.15)  (60.39)  (22.11)  (23.43) 
  Pulp, paper & print  41.38*  -48.51  53.41*  6.48  
 
 (23.19)  (30.64)  (31.95)  (43.91) 
  Chemicals  68.33***  -24.58  155.20***  96.44*** 
 (22.19)  (60.20)  (37.76)  (35.55) 
  Medical  272.51  79.85  681.55*  571.31*   
 (190.54)  (108.69)  (364.86)  (345.14) 
  Fiber, rubber & plastic  28.79  -54.47*  41.76  -18.84 
 (28.23)  (28.32)  (73.15)  (17.63) 
  Smelting  15.55  -28.35*  41.75  -21.98 
 (21.69)  (15.67)  (32.05)  (30.01) 
  Machinery manufacture  6.16  -54.18  -26.72  -59.85 
 (12.24)  (47.44)  (21.91)  (41.71) 
  Utilities  20.87**  2.2  0.62  -46.04 
 (10.09)  (63.66)  (48.36)  (70.90) 
  Transportation  144.51*  95.16***  439.38***  379.11*** 
 (84.83)  (10.56)  (94.84)  (58.23) 
  Others  40.96***  -10.94  29.16  -20.65 
 (15.68)  (44.81)  (70.07)  (38.23) 
Time 3.84  6.78  3.14  1.20 
 (8.03)  (7.90)  (18.50)  (17.48) 
Constant -3.13  129.43**  70.99  130.67 
 (73.45)  (51.03)  (124.84)  (103.53) 
No. of obs   967  914   659  664 
within R
2 0.53  0.01  0.14  0.96 
between R
2 0.11  0.76  0.98  0.95 
overall R
2 0.24  0.57  0.96  0.96 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test for random effects 
Test statistics: χ
2(1)   9.05***  8.91***  8.61**  8.52*** 
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the estimated coefficients. ***, **, and * represent 




Table 8. Estimation Results for Pollution Concentration Increase: Five-Color Ratings 
  Water pollution   Air pollution 
 TSS  COD  SO2  Dust/Smoke 
Rating dummies (base = not rated)   
  Green  -38.95  -55.95*** -46.42  -40.46 
 (25.97)  (9.49)  (70.40)  (75.08) 
  Blue  -7.09  -3.83  -12.14  -7.70 
 (18.04)  (19.48)  (23.17)  (23.33) 
  Yellow  -41.46  -63.43  -54.54*** -53.79*** 
 (26.54)  (39.15)  (12.15)  (10.35) 
  Red  -68.47**  -77.8  -101.34* -100.56 
 (34.07)  (59.15)  (59.88)  (62.64) 
  Black  9.02  -109.21** 33.02  23.29 
 (11.58)  (48.53)  (28.47)  (19.68) 
Lagged pollution intensity  -0.50*  -0.57***  -1.01*** -1.00*** 
 (0.28)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.00)   
City dummies (base = Wuxi)     
  Huanan  -47.82  -40.70*** -137.09* -134.01*   
 (38.77)  (8.29)  (79.30)  (73.40) 
  Yangzhou  8.14  -93.54*** -4.91  -31.37 
 (30.45)  (35.12)  (24.20)  (31.73) 
  Zhengjiang  8.39  -54.57**  -39.73  -43.68 
 (37.45)  (24.41)  (33.35)  (29.12) 
Firm size (base = small)     
  Large  47.88  -9.47  92.21  90.07 
 (29.90)  (24.87)  (116.47) (105.35) 
  Medium  31.91**  37.46  69.04**  74.09*** 
 (15.63)  (37.44)  (34.67)  (24.31) 
Ownership structure (base = private)   
  State-owned  -7.00  -45.87**  4.27  -7.18 
 (32.37)  (19.54)  (84.70)  (102.78) 
  Collectively-owned  -21.71  -77.1  -73.43** -74.79 
 (31.05)  (47.51)  (32.93)  (52.46) 
  HK, Macao & Taiwan investor  -65.87*  -116.33*** -140.2  -135.37 
 (35.41)  (37.48)  (96.19)  (90.21) 
  Foreign investor  -17.34  -67.09**  -59.55  -59.53 
 (38.43)  (32.29)  (46.26)  (51.74) 
  Companies with limited shares  -28.13  -62.52  -101.31** -83.70*    
 
 (23.66)  (48.72)  (41.87)  (45.07) 
   Others  -42.68**  -88.13**  -30.49  -26.83 
 (21.08)  (43.05)  (65.66)  (79.01) 
Firm age (years)  0.2  0.71  0.46  0.42 
 (0.46)  (0.95)  (0.67)  (0.70) 
Industry (base = mining)     
  Food & beverages  33.51  -100.96*  70.56  1.46 
 (30.03)  (55.52)  (49.40)  (26.47) 
  Textiles and leather  18.65**  -67.9  22.38  -22.09 
 (8.78)  (61.76)  (18.45)  (17.09) 
  Pulp & paper  50.24*  -44.35  69.28*  20.58 
 (27.29)  (31.55)  (36.85)  (49.40) 
  Chemicals  72.18***  -27.88  160.67*** 100.26*** 
 (24.02)  (60.28)  (36.49)  (31.95) 
  Medical  279.24  79.76  686.83*  573.04*   
 (194.64)  (111.22)  (366.71) (346.37) 
  Fiber, rubber & plastic  29.2  -59.85*  40.74  -22.71 
 (28.77)  (32.48)  (74.32)  (17.33) 
  Smelting  18.62  -30.11*  46.8  -20.37 
 (23.73)  (17.80)  (34.14)  (29.70) 
  Machinery manufacture  7.39  -60.81  -24.94  -61.55 
 (12.60)  (50.83)  (19.93)  (41.75) 
  Utility  21.58**  -4.32  0.34  -49.59 
 (9.66)  (68.11)  (47.24)  (71.06) 
  Transportation  147.44*  93.82*** 442.96*** 380.16*** 
 (86.75)  (11.30)  (95.04)  (57.75) 
  Others  46.08***  -11.19  36.24  -16.45 
 (17.25)  (47.13)  (71.49)  (39.33) 
Time trend  3.5  5.87  2.79  0.95 
 (8.26)  (7.28)  (18.68)  (17.70) 
Constant -6.66  134.60*** 65.27  126.36 
 (70.41)  (46.86)  (122.78) (99.61) 
No. of obs (clusters)  967 (3)  914 (4)   659 (4)  664 (4) 
within R
2  0.53 0.01  0.14 0.96 
between R
2  0.12 0.77  0.98 0.95 
overall R
2  0.24 0.57  0.96 0.96 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test for random effects 
Test statistics: χ
2(1)   9.05***  8.91***  8.61**  8.52***  
 
 Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the estimated coefficients. ***, **, and * 
represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
  
 


















Source: Revised based on Figure 1 in Wang et al. (2004). 
 
 
Comply with concentration standards
Hazardous waste disposal = 100%
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